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EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK IN THE SAME PLACE? 
ASSESSING THE REVISION TO THE POSTED 
WORKERS DIRECTIVE
Daniel Carter *
Summary: Following criticism of the current system of posted work in 
the European Union, the Revised Posted Workers Directive 2018/957 
was adopted in June 2018. This paper examines the extent to which 
the Revised Directive is likely to achieve the stated objective, as put 
forward by the Member States that criticised the current system and 
as explained in the Commission’s original proposal, of ensuring ‘equal 
pay for equal work in the same place’. The article begins by providing 
a brief overview of posted work within the European Union, including 
the adoption of the Original D−irective and its interpretation by the 
Court of Justice. By looking at the key decisions of Laval, Ruffert and 
Commission v Luxembourg, it explains how the Court’s acquis creat-
ed a system whereby foreign service providers are able to compete un-
fairly on a national market by circumventing national wage demands 
in order to gain a competitive advantage, thereby fostering a system of 
unequal pay for equal work. 
Following this, the article examines some of the wider implications of 
the Court’s case law. First, it explains how the current system of post-
ed work underlines the normative tension between the ideas of wage 
competition and social dumping in Europe. Second, it assesses the 
extent to which the Original Directive acted to deregulate the labour 
legislation of various Member States, thereby undermining their abili-
ty to pursue social policies, as well as their national autonomy. Then, 
it explains how the Directive is based solely on Treaty provisions re-
lating to service provision and establishment, and what effect this has 
on the Court’s approach to posted workers’ cases. 
Finally, the article assesses the Revised Directive. It explains the con-
crete changes to the Directive and then evaluates the extent to which 
the Revised Directive will achieve the ambition of equal pay for equal 
work. In this respect, the article claims that the Revised Directive will 
likely mitigate the more damaging consequences arising from the 
Court’s acquis, although given the more fundamental challenges that 
exist this may be limited.
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1 Introduction
The rise of populism and Euroscepticism throughout Europe brings 
into focus the extent to which the process of European integration 
should protect workers from the negative effects of globalisation. The 
area of posted work is a key example of this, with the Court of Justice 
coming under fi re for ‘opening up loopholes meaning companies are able 
to undercut the going rate in one country by paying the going rate of 
another’.1 Such decisions of the Court, for example the infamous Laval, 
but also Rüffert and Commission v Luxembourg,2 are suggested to have 
fostered a system whereby foreign service providers are able to compete 
unfairly with their domestic counterparts on a national market, circum-
venting wage demands and employment conditions that are applicable to 
domestic undertakings. More generally, this fi ts into the wider popular 
perception that the use of cheap European foreign labour has (rightly or 
wrongly) negatively affected the wages and working conditions of native 
populations of older Member States, suggested by French President Em-
manuel Macron to be a ‘betrayal of the European spirit’.3 In June 2015, 
the governments of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Sweden wrote to the Commission requesting a pro-
posal for a Revision to the Posted Workers Directive. The core message 
from the letter, as the Commission states, is that posted workers should 
receive ‘equal pay for equal work in the same place’.4 Despite earlier 
claims that problems associated with the posted workers’ system could 
be most adequately dealt with through enforcement rather than revision, 
it ultimately agreed with the Member States’ assessment. It conceded 
that the 1996 Directive ‘establishes a structural differentiation of wage 
rules applying to posted and local workers which is the institutional 
source of an un-level playing fi eld between posting and local companies, 
as well as of segmentation in the labour market’.5 It was also considered 
1  Jeremy Corbyn, Speech by the Labour Party Leader to the University of Sheffi eld, Ad-
vanced Manufacturing Research Centre (AMRC), 16 June 2016.
2  Case C341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809; Case C-346/06 Rüffert ECLI:EU:C:2008:189; 
Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2008:350.
3  Francois Murphy, ‘France’s Macron Gains Eastern Foothold on EU Posted Work-
ers’ (Thomson Reuters, 23 August 2017) available at <https://uk.reuters.com/article/
uk-france-centraleurope/frances-macron-gains-eastern-foothold-on-eu-posted-workers-
idUKKCN1B31OG> accessed 27 December 2018. 
4  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 
96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services concerning the posting 
of workers COM (2016) 128 fi nal, 4.
5  European Commission, ‘Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment accompanying the 
document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending 
Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services’ SWD (2016) 52 fi nal, 10.
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that in a number of cases posted workers are being paid signifi cantly 
less than workers employed by domestic undertakings, thereby facilitat-
ing unfair competition and fostering social dumping.6 
The area of posted work is emblematic of the tension between market 
and social integration within the European Union. Does the obligation in 
Article 3 TEU to create an internal market based on a ‘highly competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’ 
mean anything other than the establishment of a European free market 
economy?7 Or does it indicate a desire to create a strong social coun-
terbalance to market considerations, and a commitment that any eco-
nomic benefi ts should not be obtained by sacrifi cing social benefi ts and 
society?8 There exists a normative tension between promoting economic 
prosperity through transnational service provision, whilst preserving 
the social protections available to all European workers. Whether the 
posted workers’ system is considered to be the fair use of internal market 
rules, or social dumping through the undercutting of local employment 
conditions, is largely a matter of opinion. However, should European in-
tegration allow Member States to apply national laws and take measures 
aimed at ensuring that workers’ wages and conditions of employment are 
not undermined by the use of such internal market rules? Furthermore, 
does fair competition between domestic and foreign undertakings mean 
preventing a deregulatory ‘race-to-the-bottom’, whereby States get locked 
into a negative spiral as they seek to make themselves more competitive 
by reducing social standards and protections?
Despite the confl icting interests at stake, and a long-winded adop-
tion process, the Revised Posted Workers Directive 2018/957 has now 
been adopted by the Parliament and Council.9 Following successful tri-
logue discussions, the European Parliamentary Socialists & Democrats 
Group in particular took much pride in the agreed position.10 However, 
just how likely is it that the Revised Directive will realise the stated am-
bition of ‘equal pay for equal work in the same place’? This paper will 
critically assess the Revision to the Directive, looking at the controver-
sies surrounding the current posted workers regime and the goals the 
6  ibid, 12-13. 
7  TFEU, Art 3(3). See also European Commission Impact Assessment (n 5).
8  Loic Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy’ (2008) 45 CMLR 
1335, 1337; see also Ilektra Antonaki, ‘Collective Redundancies in Greece: AGET Iraklis 
(2017) 54(5) CMLR 1513.
9  Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 
amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services [2018] OJ L173/16.
10  Proposal for a Directive (n 4).
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Directive sets out to achieve. In order to do this, fi rst there will be a brief 
account of the history of posted work in the European Union, as well as 
the adoption of the original Posted Workers Directive and its interpreta-
tion by the Court of Justice. Secondly, the paper will examine the wider 
implications of the Court’s approach and criticisms of the posted workers 
system more generally, as well as the extent to which these are likely to 
frustrate the realisation of the goal of ‘equal pay for equal work in the 
same place’. Finally, the Revision to the Directive itself will be evaluated, 
looking at what concrete changes have been made, as well as how it will 
likely affect the Court’s acquis and approach to posted workers’ cases 
and the realisation of the Directive’s aims.
2 Brief introduction to posted workers 
2.1 The origins of posted workers
Under private international law (Rome I Convention, now Rome I 
Regulation), if the applicable law is not chosen within an employment 
contract, then a worker is subject to the employment conditions of the 
country where the employee usually carriers out their job: ie where they 
‘habitually’ work, even when temporarily employed in another country.11 
This means workers sent to another country are, in principle, regulat-
ed by the State where the employer’s establishment is situated, ie the 
‘country of origin’ principle.12 On the other hand, migrant workers in the 
European Union that move of their own accord to work in another Mem-
ber State under the provisions on the free movement of workers are im-
mediately entitled to the exact same ‘social advantages’ as Member State 
nationals, ie the ‘day one’ principle, thereby becoming instantly and fully 
embedded within the host society.13
Originally, EU law did not distinguish between workers under the 
Treaties and those that are now considered as posted workers, ie persons 
sent by a service provider established in one Member State to carry out 
11  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6, Art 8; See 
also Marc de Vos, ‘Free Movement of Workers, Free Movement of Services and the Posted 
Workers Directive: A Bermuda Triangle for National Labour Standards?’ (2006) 7(3) ERA 
Forum 356, 356.
12  Herwig Verschueren, ‘The European Internal Market and Competition between Workers’ 
(2015) 6(2) European Labour Law Journal 137; Stein Evju, ‘Revisiting the Posted Workers 
Directive: Confl ict of Laws and Laws in Contrast’ (2010) 12 Cambridge Year Book of Euro-
pean Legal Studies 151, 155.
13  Evju (n 12) 155; Verschueren (n 12); Regulation 492/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union 
[2011] OJ L141/1, Art 7(2).
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work temporarily in another.14 The Court stated in Commission v France 
that the application of the Treaty provisions on the free movement of 
workers should not mean that a Member State’s own nationals suffer 
‘unfavourable consequences’ resulting from nationals of other Member 
States working under conditions of employment or for remuneration 
less advantageous that those obtained under national law.15 In Seco & 
Desquenne, which concerned posted workers from a third country (and 
therefore not covered by the provisions on the free movement of workers), 
the Court applied this principle by holding that Community law did not 
preclude Member States from extending their rules on minimum wages 
to any persons employed within their territory, even temporarily, and 
regardless of the origin of the employer.16
The question of posted workers did not arise until the accession of 
the Southern Member States in the 1980s.17 Rush Portuguesa concerned 
a contract tender in France. At that time under the Portugal Accession 
Agreement the provisions on the free movement of workers did not ap-
ply to Portuguese workers, who were treated as third country nationals. 
This was part of the transitional controls imposed upon the accession 
States due to the divergent wage rates between the old and new Mem-
ber States. At the same time, however, Portuguese undertakings did 
benefi t from the provisions on services. The question was then to what 
extent could France apply its national labour legislation to the Portu-
guese (non-Member State) workers, or whether these workers should be 
considered as part of the service provider. The Advocate General sug-
gested only including certain types of workers within the undertaking 
for the purposes of service provision.18 However, in a now typical move, 
the Court took a much stronger economic market integration stance.19 It 
distinguished between posted workers and those falling under the free 
movement of workers, as posted workers ‘return to their country of origin 
after the completion of their work without at any time gaining access to 
the labour market of the host Member State’.20 With this principle, the 
14  Jon Erik Dolvik & Jelle Visser, ‘Free Movement, Equal Treatment and Workers’ Rights: 
Can the European Union Solve Its Trilemma of Fundamental Principles?’ (2009) 40(6) In-
dustrial Relations Journal 491, 495.
15  Case C-167/73 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1974:35, para 45; see also Evju (n 12) 
153. 
16  Case C-2/81 Seco & Desquenne ECLI:EU:C:1982:34, para 14.
17  Dolvik & Visser (n 14) 492.
18  Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa v Offi ce national d’immigration ECLI:EU:C:1990:107, 
Opinion of AG van Gerven. 
19  Evju (n 12) 162.
20  Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa v Offi ce national d’immigration ECLI:EU:C:1990:142, 
para 15.
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Court effectively established an entirely new legal basis for the (tempo-
rary) movement of workers, while at the same time encroaching upon 
another.21 However, in doing so, the Court then went on to effectively 
extend the Seco principle (which only related to minimum wage rates) 
to all national labour legislation. It is unclear whether this was simply 
confused judicial reasoning, or a conscious policy decision intended to 
appease France and other Member States with strong labour legislation, 
given the far-reaching implications of establishing a new basis for the 
movement of workers in the EU.22 
Effectively, Rush meant that posted workers were not considered to 
form part of the host country’s labour market, and, as such, the entire 
acquis on workers did not apply to them. By establishing the concept of 
posted workers, it allowed the circumvention of enlargement transitional 
controls adopted by most Member States, as there were no controls ap-
plying to service providers.23 The question of posted workers may never 
have arisen had Portuguese workers benefi ted from the free movement 
of workers provisions at the time. It led to a situation whereby workers 
could not work on the basis of the free movement of workers, which pro-
tects both migrant and native workers by integrating the migrant into 
the host State to the greatest extent, but could do so as part of a service 
provider, which offers fewest protections to the worker and commodifi es 
their labour.24 That being said, in Rush the Court also handed the Mem-
ber States ‘most of the aces’, as they were still potentially permitted to 
impose all national labour legislation upon foreign services providers 
and their workers.25
In the wake of Rush, Member States applied two main approach-
es when it comes to extending the labour rights and conditions that 
are available to native workers. On the one hand, some States (such as 
France and the UK) extended to all out-of-state services providers nation-
al rules on social security, wages, working time, and working conditions 
(both legislation and collectively agreed). However, other Member States 
such as Germany introduced more limited legislation, which only applied 
to the construction industry and only covered minimum wages.26 In sub-
21  Evju (n 12) 162.
22  Evju (n 12) 163; see Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa v Offi ce national d’immigration 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:142, para 18.
23  de Vos (n 11) 358.
24  Dagmar Schiek, ‘Perspectives on Social Citizenship in the EU: From Status Positivus to 
Status Socialis Activus via Two Forms of Transnational Solidarity’ in Dimitry Kochenov (ed), 
EU Citizenship and Federalism: the Role of Rights (CUP 2015) 355-357.
25  Paul Davies, ‘Posted Workers: Single Market or Protection of National Labour Law Sys-
tems?’ (1997) 34 CMLR 571, 591.
26  ibid, 590.
37CYELP 14 [2018] 31-68
sequent cases, the Court held that collective agreements could typically 
be applied, provided they were suffi ciently clear, precise, and accessi-
ble, and it was possible for the employer to determine his obligations,27 
and did not discriminate between domestic and foreign undertakings.28 
Whilst the Court tended to demand that the application of national rules 
had to be done through ‘appropriate means’, such application could nor-
mally be justifi ed despite the chilling effect upon cross-border service 
providers.29 However, in spite of this, a number of Member States began 
to become concerned about the application of host-State rules, given the 
effects of migrant labour from states with much lower wage rates and 
employment conditions. 
2.2 The original Posted Workers Directive
The Posted Workers Directive was ultimately the result of a number 
of failed legislative attempts in the 1970s and 1980s. The 1976 Draft 
Regulation on the Confl ict of Laws pertaining to employment relations 
within the Community had as its objective equal treatment of all work-
ers and was directed at workers rather than service providers. It main-
tained the country of origin principle in general, except for a number of 
specifi c fi elds, which are very similar to Article 3(1) PWD.30 There was 
also a proposal for a social clause related to public works in the 1980s.31 
Having failed to secure this, social partners pushed for a more exten-
sive measure applying to the posting of workers generally and based on 
host-State law from day one. This was supported by a number of Member 
States that had considered the transitional arrangements to be a let-
down, given that the cross-border posting of workers became an easy 
channel for westward labour migration that circumvented transitional 
controls.32
The Commission made a fi rst proposal for a Posted Workers Direc-
tive in 1991, stipulating that the host-State’s conditions should apply to 
core working conditions, including minimum wages. But this was un-
popular with a number of Member States, particularly given that Rush 
Portuguesa meant they had the possibility of applying labour legislation 
and had little to gain from Community legislation.33 The second propos-
27  Case C-369/96 Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL ECLI:EU:C:1999:575.
28  Case C-49/89 Finalarte ECLI:EU:C:2001:564.
29  Davies (n 25) 586.
30  Evju (n 12)157-158.
31  Dolvik & Visser (n 14) 496.
32  ibid, 497; Evju (n 12) 159-160.
33  Jan Cremers, ‘The Posting Directive: Origins and Assessment’ (1995) 1(2) Transfer: Eu-
ropean Review of Labour and Research 309, 309-310; Davies (n 25) 591.
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al by the Commission took into consideration more of the prerogatives 
of the Member States, by reducing the temporal threshold after which 
Member States must apply their national legislation (France), as well as 
removing the erga omnes effect of the Directive (Germany), and including 
Article 3(8) relating to collective agreements (Denmark and Italy).34
Given the controversy surrounding the Directive, and in order to 
avoid the unanimity requirements applying to worker protection issues, 
the legal bases chosen for the proposal were the freedom of establish-
ment and service provisions.35 As the free movement of workers was not 
a legal base for the original Directive, the Community Charter Funda-
mental Social Rights of Workers did not apply, and neither did the Treaty 
provisions in the social fi eld relating to worker protection. Ultimately, the 
unanimity requirements would have been fatal to the adoption of the Di-
rective. The United Kingdom actually voted against the Directive, consid-
ering it on principle to be anti-competitive, whilst Portugal abstained as 
its undertakings, the main benefi ciaries of the posted workers system, 
stood to lose out.36
The shift away from labour law and workers’ individual rights to-
wards the rights of service providers ‘set the tone’ for the framing of the 
Directive.37 The Directive nominally has the dual aims of (i) facilitating 
the cross-border provision of services by enhancing legal certainty, and 
(ii) offering protection to posted workers.38 Recitals 2 and 3 of the Orig-
inal Directive emphasise that the internal market creates a ‘dynamic 
environment’ for service provision, and that any restrictions based on 
nationality or residence are prohibited. Recital 5 indicates that this re-
quires ‘a climate of fair competition and measures guaranteeing respect 
for the rights of workers’. However, as subsequent developments have 
shown, the promotion of the transnational provision of services is clearly 
the primary objective, with ensuring fair competition and respect for the 
rights of workers a distant second.39 The ‘cornerstone’ of the Directive 
is Article 3(1), which introduces a number of minimum standards that 
Member States must guarantee, as part of a ‘hard core of clearly defi ned 
protective rules’.40 These must be laid down either by ‘law, regulation 
or administrative provision’, or by ‘collective agreements or arbitration 
34  Evju (n 12) 165-166.
35  Dolvik & Visser (n 14) 496.
36  Evju (n 12) 168.
37  Evju (n 12) 164.
38  Dolvik & Visser (n 14) 496.
39  Evju (n 12) 168.
40  European Commission Impact Assessment (n 5) 10; Evju (n 12) 168-169.
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awards which have been declared universally applicable’. In particular, 
Article 3(1)(c) refers to ‘minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates’. 
2.3 Interpreting the Posted Workers Directive 
Even at the time of the Directive’s adoption, there was uncertainty 
over its precise scope and value. Would the promotion of the cross-bor-
der provision of services be reconciled with the acceptance that labour 
regulations perform a legitimate function in protecting the weaker party 
within a contractual relationship, or would the Court take the view that 
Rush Portuguesa ‘trenches too far’ upon the Treaty rights of service pro-
viders?41 In this section, three decisions will be examined, namely those 
of Laval, Rüffert, and Commission v Luxembourg, to demonstrate how the 
Court interpreted Article 3(1), in particular the rules of pay, and how 
these interpretations led to the criticisms of the posted workers regime 
that have ultimately led to the Revision to the Directive.  
Laval concerned a Latvian company that posted workers to Swe-
den in order to construct a school extension. There was an expectation 
that Laval would apply the Swedish national collective agreement to its 
own posted workers, which at the time was predominantly negotiated 
between management and workers within a company on a case-by-case 
basis. The Swedish trade union included within the collective agreement 
an obligation on Laval to pay its workers approximately 16 per hour.42 
Laval offered around half this rate, along with some additional benefi ts, 
claiming that signing the collective agreement meant that they would not 
know what wages it would have to pay (it is not clear why Laval could not 
look at previous wage increases and/or rates of infl ation, as did the trade 
union when making the wage demands). The trade union decided to take 
strike action, and was soon followed by sympathy strike protests. Laval 
then complained that the trade union’s action violated Article 56 TFEU. 
The Court determined that Article 3(1) only relates to minimum rates of 
pay. As the conditions the trade union sought were not minimum wages 
under either Article 3(1) or (8) of the Directive, it was held that they fell 
outside its scope.43 It then proceeded to determine that the trade union’s 
actions in trying to enforce the Swedish rule were an unjustifi able re-
striction on the Treaty provisions on the freedom to provide services.
Rüffert concerned a public tender contract awarded by Lower Sax-
ony. Within its system of public procurement, Lower Saxony had a rule 
that obliged public authorities to award contracts or building works only 
41  Davies (n 25) 573-574; 596-598.
42  Laval (n 2) paras 30-31.
43  Laval (n 2) para 70.
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to undertakings paying wages laid down in the local collective agree-
ment. As the company committed to pay its employees only around half 
of what was in applicable collective agreements, Lower Saxony fi ned 
Rüffert. The company challenged the decision on the basis that Arti-
cle 56 TFEU precludes a statutory obligation to pay employees wages in 
collective agreements applicable to the public sector. The Court decided 
that the rules could not be considered as a ‘law’ under Article 3(1) of 
the Directive because it does not fi x any minimum rates of pay itself. 
Furthermore, the collective agreements had not been declared univer-
sally applicable in accordance with the Directive. The fi rst paragraph of 
Article 3(8) could not apply, as Germany did have a system for declar-
ing collective agreements universally applicable (this only applies when 
there is no system for doing this at all). It could also not fall under the 
second paragraph of Article 3(8) as the agreement was not generally ap-
plicable to all similar undertakings in the geographical area and in the 
profession or industry concerned.44 Moreover, the Court agreed with the 
Commission that the Lower Saxony rules discriminated between the pri-
vate and public sectors, given that the collective agreement only applies 
to construction workers in the public sector.45 The Court also confi rmed 
that cross-border services cannot be made conditional upon conditions 
that ‘…go beyond the mandatory rules for minimum protection’.46 This 
meant that the State could not rely on the Directive, and the Court found 
that the measure was ‘an additional economic burden that may prohibit, 
impede or render less attractive the provision of their services in the host 
Member State’.47 The Court then went on to use the same reasoning to 
fi nd that the measure could not be justifi ed.
Finally, Commission v Luxembourg concerned the Commission’s in-
fringement proceedings against Luxembourg for a number of national 
rules relating to the Posted Workers Directive. Luxembourg had argued 
that, even if the national rules were not covered under Article 3(1), then 
the exception contained in Article 3(10) which states that the Directive 
shall not apply to conditions of employment outside Article 3(1) ‘in the 
case of public policy provisions’ should apply. In particular, two com-
plaints are important: the automatic adjustment of wage rates in order 
to meet the costs of living, and rules relating to collective agreements. 
In terms of the automatic cost-of-living adjustments, the Court held that 
the Community legislature intended to limit the possibility of Member 
States intervening as regards pay. As such, any measures relating to 
44  Rüffert (n 2) para 39.
45  ibid, paras 39-40.
46  ibid, para 33.
47  ibid, para 37.
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the automatic adjustments of rates of pay other than the minimum wage 
would fall outside the scope of Article 3(1).48 As regards the public policy 
exception, the Court used the terminology of the Rome I Regulation to 
hold that this must be deemed ‘so crucial for the protection of the polit-
ical, social, or economic order’ of the Member State concerned so as to 
require compliance by all persons in that State, and should furthermore 
be interpreted restrictively.49 The Court considered that Luxembourg had 
failed to submit ‘appropriate evidence of the expediency and proportion-
ality of the restrictive measure’,50 and as such found that it could not rely 
on Article 3(10). The Court also held that the rules on collective agree-
ments could not fall under the public policy exception, as these need to 
be declared universally applicable, which was not the case.51
2.4 Evaluating the Court’s approach to posted workers 
The Court has been criticised for focusing too much on the Direc-
tive’s primary objective of facilitating service provision and not enough 
on the nominal objective of ensuring fair competition and protecting 
workers. Most pertinently, Member States cannot impose labour legis-
lation that goes beyond what is listed in Article 3(1), going some way to 
reviving the country of origin principle,52 particularly in the case of wage 
demands that are not the legislated minimum wage in the host State. In 
fact, outside the ‘hard nucleus’ contained in Article 3(1), the country of 
origin continues to apply.53 Article 3(1) should therefore not been seen 
as setting minimum standards, but rather a confl ict of laws provision 
which allows posted workers to rely on the basic standards listed, which 
prevail over Articles 4 and 8 of the Rome Regulation.54 This means that 
in a number of situations, labour standards of low-cost home States can 
be directly translated on to the territory of the host State in what Deakin 
describes as ‘a form of legally mandated social arbitrage in which labour 
law regimes are placed in direct competition with each other’.55 By apply-
ing the market-access Säger approach, which focuses on the effect of the 
national measure on the market access of out-of-state actors and ignores 
48  Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2008:350, para 47.
49  ibid, paras 29-30; see Regulation No 593/2008 (n 11) Art 9.
50  Commission v Luxembourg (n 48) para 51.
51  ibid, para 67.
52  Simon Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition in European after Laval’ (2008) Centre for Busi-
ness Research Working Paper No 364, University of Cambridge, 6.
53  Dolvik & Visser (n 14) 497.
54  Evju (n 12)168-169.
55  Deakin (n 52) 15.
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the negative effects it may have on in-state actors,56 the Court commits 
to what can be described as a ‘highly deregulatory principle’.57 Further-
more, the Court’s approach means that Directive 96/71 and Article 56 
TFEU are mutually reinforcing: measures that fall outside the Directive 
for going beyond its mandatory rules in Article 3(1) will be found to be 
disproportionate precisely because they fall outside the Directive. Last-
ly, the Court’s interpretation of Article 3(10) means that very little, if 
anything, can be justifi ed under the public policy exception contained 
therein. 
2.4.1 Laval 
The absence of a legislated minimum wage or a system of declaring 
collective agreements universally applicable in Laval means that there 
is simply no minimum rate of pay within the Swedish system, and thus 
Article 3(1)(c) offers no protection. The Court’s reasoning revolves entirely 
around the fact that under Directive 96/71 employers are required ‘to ob-
serve a nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection in the host 
State’.58 This means that an obligation to pay a certain wage (arguably 
any wage) would therefore always be disproportionate. Any demands by 
Member States or their social partners that undertakings pay more than 
the minimum rate of pay is therefore a violation of Article 56 TFEU and 
must in principle be justifi ed. However, as the Directive lays down both 
the minimum and maximum wage demands that can be imposed under 
service providers, ie it fully harmonises wage rates applicable to foreign 
service providers,59 this means that any measure falling outside the Di-
rective will also be disproportionate. Laval also places excessive empha-
sis on formal legislated minimum rates of pay at the expense of other 
looser forms of wage agreement. Collective autonomy was ‘too messy, too 
uncertain, too disruptive’ compared to judicially enforced legislation as 
a means of setting and protecting standards for posted workers.60 This 
undermines the Court’s claim that Member States are free to choose a 
system of wage negotiation outside those permitted under the Directive.61 
Lastly, it is even suggested that the situation in Laval does not actually 
impose any additional costs upon Laval which made it more diffi cult to 
56  Catherine Barnard, ‘A Proportionate Response to Proportionality in the Field of Collective 
Action’ (2012) 37(2) EL Rev 118; see Case C-76/90 Säger ECLI:EU:C:1991:331.
57  Catherine Barnard, ‘Posted Workers: Single Market or Protection of National Labour Law 
Systems?’ (1997) 34 CMLR 571, 588.
58  Laval (n 2) para 108.
59  Barnard (n 56); Evju (n 12) 171, 175; Deakin (n 52) 4.
60  Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Laval’s Regulatory Conundrum: Collective Standard-Setting and the 
Court’s New Approach to Posted Workers’ (2009) EL Rev 844, 856.
61  Laval (n 2) para 68; Kilpatrick (n 60) 852.
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operate in Sweden, at least when compared to the costs that would have 
been incurred had the Swedish rule not existed, or even in comparison 
to Swedish undertakings.62 
The Court had alternative interpretations of the Directive available 
to it. It could have interpreted Article 3(1) less as a confl ict of laws rule, 
and more as a fl oor of minimum rights. This would mean that in the 
absence of any minimum rate of pay in Swedish law, at least its wage 
negotiation legislation could be applied. This would also be the widely 
accepted understanding of how other directives and regulations func-
tion, which seek to establish a fl oor of rights above which regulatory 
competition is possible.63 The Court could still have conditioned the ap-
plication of the national rule on the basis that it is done through ‘ap-
propriate means’. Alternatively, more focus could be placed on the un-
equal treatment occurring between service providers, rather than simply 
looking at their market access. This was the approach of Advocate Gen-
eral Mengozzi in his Opinion.64 AG Mengozzi considered that the aim 
of Article 3(1), besides creating minimum standards, is to ensure that 
there is equal treatment between service providers. Moreover, he believed 
that the Swedish legislation in question guarantees trade unions the 
opportunity to impose wage conditions laid down or governed by Swed-
ish collective agreements,65 meaning that the rates included within such 
collective agreements are, at least indirectly, legislated for. The Court 
demonstrated a strong reluctance to allow pay determined in Swedish 
collective agreements, or indeed any case-by-case agreement, to be con-
sidered as a ‘minimum’ rather than simply the going rate for the job, 
potentially undermining the commitment not to protect national systems 
of wage setting.
2.4.2 Rüffert
The Rüffert decision suggests that in the context of public procure-
ment, foreign service providers can circumvent wage demands that are 
applicable to domestic undertakings. In fact, the Court explicitly stated 
that the Lower Saxony rule would result in foreign undertakings los-
ing ‘the competitive advantage which they enjoy by reason of their lower 
wage costs’.66 This means that any demand going beyond Article 3(1) will 
result in the foreign service provider losing their competitive advantage 
62  Deakin (n 52) 4.
63  ibid, 14.
64  Case C341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:291, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para 171.
65  ibid, para 185.
66  Ruffert (n 2) para 14.
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and thereby falling outside its scope, confi rming the minimum / maxi-
mum principle in Laval.67 The decision also narrows the specifi c types 
of collective agreements that Article 3(1) can apply to. The Directive is 
supposed to allow for different types of collective agreements; however, 
it is clear that differentiating between public sector and private sector 
wage rates is not possible − despite the fact that a local authority is 
unable to set private sector wage rates. Locally agreed public sector col-
lective agreements, typical in many Member States, are therefore dis-
criminatory under the Directive.68 This would also likely be the case 
with non-binding obligations to pay a ‘living wage’, if this goes above the 
legislated minimum wage.
Similarly to Laval, the Advocate General in Rüffert came to the oppo-
site conclusion to the Court, using an entirely different approach. For AG 
Bot, the only important consideration was whether the rules complied 
with the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality. As 
such, service providers would be subject to the same obligation relating 
to rates of (minimum) pay applicable to the location where the services 
were being performed.69 He also considered that Article 3(7) of the Di-
rective permits in principle ‘…the implementation of enhanced national 
protection’, meaning that Member States should be entitled to demand 
a higher rate of pay when it concerns public contracts that improve the 
level of social protection.70 However, such enhanced national protection 
must comply with Article 56 TFEU. Finally, he also considered that the 
‘social objectives’ contained in the 2004 Public Procurement Directive 
would allow such wage demands, a point which the Court curiously 
omitted entirely, given the subject matter of the case.
2.4.3 Commission v Luxembourg
Finally, the Commission v Luxembourg decision means that virtually 
any measure that goes beyond Article 3(1) cannot be justifi ed using the 
public policy exception in Article 3(10). Yet again, this went against the 
Opinion of the Advocate General, who considered that the automatic ad-
justment of pay in line with cost of living changes actually fulfi lled the 
requirements of Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive.71 However, the Court did 
not agree, and created an incredibly stringent test based on Article 9 of 
67  Vasiliki Kosta, Fundamental Rights in EU Internal Market Legislation (Bloomsbury 2015) 
203.
68  Kilpatrick (n 60) 848.
69  Case C346/06 Rüffert ECLI:EU:C:2007:541, Opinion of AG Bot, para 131.
70  ibid, para 83.
71  Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2007:516, Opinion of AG Trsten-
jak, para 54.
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the Rome I Regulation, which makes it effectively impossible to establish 
except in exceptional circumstances, for example the prohibition of slav-
ery.72 In both Laval and Rüffert, the Court employed circular reasoning 
to fi nd that measures falling outside the scope of the Directive cannot 
be justifi ed on the basis of Article 56 TFEU because it goes beyond the 
conditions laid down in Article 3(1). The Court did not follow the Advo-
cate General’s consideration in Laval that the law in question was an 
appropriate and necessary means of preventing social dumping.73 Fur-
thermore, in Rüffert, unlike the Advocate General, the Court considered 
that Article 3(7) could not be considered as allowing for ‘enhanced na-
tional protection’, as it would allow Member States to impose terms and 
conditions of employment beyond the minimum protection contained in 
Article 3(1).74 When combined with the stringent test imposed under the 
public policy exception contained in Article 3(10), justifi cation in the area 
of posted workers seems almost impossible. 
2.5 Conclusion: unequal pay for equal work?
The Court’s approach to interpreting the Directive has arguably 
been most liberal for service providers and most restrictive for Member 
States and social partners. Despite the Directive’s clear social objective, 
following the Court’s Laval case law ‘the economic has taken precedence 
over the social’, with the objectives of fair competition and respect for the 
rights of workers clearly secondary to the promotion of the transnational 
provision of services.75 In particular, the Court’s approach to interpreting 
Article 3(1) of the Directive as a confl ict of laws instrument instead of a 
minimum fl oor of rights, as well as the extremely limited possibility of 
justifying either under Article 3(10) of the Directive or Article 56 TFEU 
directly, suggests that there are three situations in which foreign service 
providers can circumvent wage demands applicable to domestic under-
takings, thereby fostering a system of unequal pay for equal work. First, 
where there is no minimum rate of pay due to the system of industrial 
relations in the host Member State, a foreign service provider can pay its 
posted workers below the collectively agreed rate in that sector. There is 
72  Commission v Luxembourg (n 48) para 29; Louise Merrett, ‘Posted Workers in Europe 
from a Private International Law Perspective’ (2011) 13 Cambridge Year Book of European 
Legal Studies 219, 233; Dolvik & Visser (n 14) 502-503. See also Catherine Barnard, ‘The 
UK and Posted Workers: The Effect of Commission v Luxembourg on the Territorial Appli-
cation of British Labour Law’ (2009) 38 Industrial Law Journal 122.
73  Rüffert (n 69) paras 119, 122. The Court did not even discuss the justifi cation of com-
batting social dumping.
74  Rüffert (n 2) para 33.
75  Evju (n 12) 168-170. See also Catherine Barnard, ‘Social Dumping or Dumping Social-
ism’ (2008) 67(2) Cambridge Law Journal 262; Cremers (n 33). 
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no obligation under Article 3(1)(c) to pay the minimum rate of pay simply 
because there is no minimum rate of pay. As was the case with Sweden, 
Member States are forced either to change their systems of industrial re-
lations or accept a system that fosters unfair competition by paying wag-
es below those applicable to domestic undertakings. Secondly, if there 
is a system for declaring collective agreements universally applicable, 
then any wage demands going beyond this will not be covered by the 
Directive. Even if it is effectively impossible to declare these agreements 
universally applicable (for example, they only apply to public sector con-
tracts), then this again will fall outside the scope of the Directive. Foreign 
service providers are thus able to actively use differences in obligations 
between domestic and foreign undertakings to gain an advantage on a 
national market whilst Member States simply cannot force them to pay 
the same rate as would be applicable to domestic undertakings. Thirdly, 
even if there is a legislated minimum wage in the country in question, 
the Court’s approach to interpreting Article 3(1)(c) means that this can 
become the maximum that a Member State can demand from a foreign 
service provider. As the Commission has noted, often the ‘minimum rate 
of pay’ for a specifi c job is interpreted as meaning a ‘minimum legislated 
wage’,76 suggesting that protection is unnecessary where it goes beyond 
the lowest level provided by law in the host State.77 It is suggested that 
the Court may fi nd that no space exists for a second and higher min-
imum pay rate set collectively. Indeed, even collective action to enforce 
statutory minimum wages would be found to be disproportionate if other 
methods of enforcement were available.78 Finally, if a measure is found to 
fall outside Article 3(1), there are very limited possibilities to justify this 
under either Article 3(10) of the Directive, or Article 56 TFEU.
3 Realising ‘equal pay for equal work in the same place’ 
After having examined the Court’s approach to interpreting the 
Posted Workers Directive, the following section will claim that the Court’s 
approach (and system of posted work more generally) has three key im-
plications that are liable to frustrate the realisation of the aim of ‘equal 
pay for equal work in the same work’. In this respect, it will be suggested 
that the Court’s approach (i) strikes at the heart of the normative tension 
between the concepts of social dumping and competition on the basis of 
wages; (ii) emphasises the deregulatory nature of the Directive and Eu-
ropean integration in general; and (iii) highlights the ‘market-bias’ (ie the 
lack of social considerations) built into the Directive itself. 
76  European Commission Impact Assessment (n 5) 11.
77  Deakin (n 52) 17.
78  Kilpatrick (n 60) 854-856.
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3.1 Social dumping & wage competition 
The fi rst issue is the normative distinction between when the use 
of posted workers is the fair use of internal market rules to gain a com-
petitive advantage against one’s competitors, and when it illegitimately 
undercuts local wages and employment standards, thereby resulting in 
what might be considered as ‘social dumping’. The Court has empha-
sised that preventing unfair competition, protecting workers, and com-
batting social dumping are all valid (and often interlinked) objectives 
that can potentially justify a restriction to free movement.79 Battling so-
cial dumping is also suggested to be a key factor behind the revision to 
the Directive.80  However, concretely defi ning this concept, particularly 
in the context of posted workers, is extremely diffi cult. The term tends 
to be thrown around by those seeking to use it to their own ends, which 
can result in inconsistent and ill-grounded perceptions.81 Defi nitions 
such as the ‘application of different wages and social protection rules’,82 
or ‘undermining or evading existing social regulations with the aim of 
gaining competitive advantage’,83 tend to omit the fact that the applica-
tion of different wages and social protection rules forms the basis of the 
competition in which undertakings (and Member States) engage in order 
to sell products and enter new markets. 
It should also be emphasised that competition in terms of labour 
costs and wages is something that happens in every sector and in ev-
ery jurisdiction, and is no more a source of unfair competition or social 
dumping than it is within national markets. Lower paid workers may 
produce cheaper goods in other Member States, and yet these goods can-
not be excluded from national markets merely because they have been 
produced using labour costs and standards from a State where these 
are lower.84 Allowing Member States to exploit their full comparative ad-
vantage and giving companies the chance to restructure their activity 
79  See Case C244/04 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2006:49, paras 57, 61; Laval (n 
2) para 103; Laval (n 64) para 249; Rüffert (n 69) paras 114-122; Case C-549/13 Bundes-
druckerei ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235, para 31.
80  Silvia Pelz, ‘S&Ds Score Important Victory for European Workers: Equal Pay for Equal 
Work in the Same Place Now within Reach’ (S&D, March 2018) available at <www.social-
istsanddemocrats.eu/newsroom/sds-score-important-victory-european-workers-equal-
pay-equal-work-same-place-now-within> accessed 22 December 2018.
81  Magdalena Bernaciak, ‘Social Dumping and the European Integration Process’ (2014) 
European Trade Union Institute Working Paper 2014.06.
82  See European Parliament Briefi ng, ‘Understanding Social Dumping in the Euro-
pean Union’ (March 2017) available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
BRIE/2017/599353/EPRS_BRI(2017)599353_EN.pdf> accessed 22 December 2018.
83  Bernaciak (n 81) 5.
84  Davies (n 25) 598.
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on a pan-European scale is suggested to improve the attractiveness of 
Europe as a whole as a place to create wealth and employment.85 What 
might legitimately be considered as ‘unfairly’ competing on the market 
through the use of differing labour costs and standards between regula-
tory regimes can therefore also be seen as the smooth functioning of the 
internal market and the use of various competitive advantages, which 
will lead to overall effi ciencies.86 However, the drive for effi ciencies and 
competitiveness between Member States has meant increased competi-
tion in all areas, with labour costs being a core aspect of this.87
Moreover, it is suggested that linking social dumping directly with 
the higher standards in Western Member States is ‘Western-centric, ar-
bitrary and normative’.88 However, this surely overlooks the point that 
social dumping can only ever be seen as from the perspective of those 
that are negatively affected by it. Imposing the legislation of high-regula-
tion States may be Western-centric, but there is nothing to stop Eastern 
States adopting and applying higher standards should they so wish. In-
deed, the idea of ‘upward convergence’ suggests that European integra-
tion should encourage newer Member States to ‘catch up’ with their tra-
ditional counterparts by improving wages, social rights, and protections 
at a greater rate.89 Whilst accession States, in particular the ex-Soviet 
bloc, were encouraged to join the internal market precisely because they 
would have a competitive advantage in relation to the established west-
ern and northern Member States, this advantage is not envisaged to be 
permanent. It will be interesting to see if in some years’ time Member 
States such as Poland will be making the same pro-competition argu-
ments against the Balkan States, who will have likely joined the EU 
by then, when it is they who are the high-wage States trying to protect 
their citizens from the negative effects of regulatory competition and so-
cial dumping. In any event, the current dynamic is likely to result in 
pressures being placed on both high-wage and low-wage States to either 
actively reduce wage rates and employment standards, or at least where 
there is little incentive to raise them. In its Impact Assessment to the 
Revised Directive, the European Commission already conceded the pres-
sures the posted workers’ regime can place on wages in some sectors. 
85  Andre Sapir, ‘Globalisation and the Reform of European Social Models’ (2005) Bruegel 
Policy Paper 4 available at <http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publica-
tions/pc_sept2005_socialmod.pdf> accessed 22 December 2018.
86  Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, EU Enlargement versus Social Europe? The Uncertain Future 
of the European Social Model (Edward Elgar Publishing 2003). 
87  European Commission Impact Assessment (n 5) 4.
88  Bernaciak (n 81) 8.
89  See European Parliament Report on Social Dumping in the European Union (2015) A8-
0255/2016.
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However, whether the use of these kinds of comparative advantages 
on the basis of wage competition is viewed as creating effi ciencies in the 
internal market, or condemned as social dumping, is therefore largely a 
normative question that tends to be based mostly on one’s perspective.90 
Simply put, one person’s social dumping is another’s competitive advan-
tage. But whilst there may be improvements in innovation, effi ciencies, 
and productivity, pressures are also placed on wages and employment 
conditions. More focus is placed by EU institutions on the market and 
on ensuring free competition as the ‘general solution’ to Europe’s prob-
lems,91 a claim which could be equally directed at the Commission and 
the Court of Justice, at least in the context of posted workers.
This is not to say that competition on the basis of wages is unprob-
lematic, as was suggested around the time of the adoption of the original 
Posted Workers Directive. The idea that competition from workers whose 
wages are lower or that other terms and conditions of employment are 
less advantageous is necessarily unfair to workers from higher-regula-
tion States was claimed to be ‘surely erroneous’, and that wage compe-
tition does not necessarily lead to lower prices, as other factors such as 
productivity play a more important role.92 Whilst this is true to a certain 
extent, the idea that labour costs do not have an effect on wages is surely 
also erroneous, particularly when undertakings are competing for the 
performance of a works contract or public tender, rather than, for exam-
ple, German or Danish goods competing with cheaper products in other 
Member States where consumers’ preferences are likely to be based on 
more than simply price. In terms of posted workers, it is suggested that 
they themselves benefi t from the current arrangement, and that accusa-
tions of diminished social rights in receiving countries can just as eas-
ily be framed in terms of the gained social rights of workers in sending 
countries.93 Barnard tentatively agrees, suggesting that ‘opening up the 
markets will benefi t … workers, improving their prosperity’.94 However, 
if (for example) Swedish workers are replaced by those from Latvia pre-
cisely because they will work for lower wages and worse conditions than 
the Swedish workers, whose social rights have actually been improved? 
The fact the Latvian company won a contract certainly could result in 
90  Catherine Barnard, ‘Social Dumping and the Race to the Bottom: Some Lessons for the 
European Union from Delaware?’ (2000) 25(1) EL Rev 57, 68.
91  Fritz Scharpf, ‘Why the European Union Cannot Be a Social Market Economy’ (2010) 8(2) 
Socio-Economic Review 211, 225.
92  Davies (n 25) 598-599.
93  See Barnard (n 56) 123. Barnard makes the point in response to a claim by D Kukovec in 
‘Whose Social Europe?’ available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1800922> accessed 22 December 2018. 
94  Barnard (n 56) 123.
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greater economic growth, which itself could in turn result in higher wag-
es and employment conditions being provided to Latvian workers, but 
this is in no way guaranteed. On the other hand, the Swedish workers 
have lost their employment and may face future pressures on wage rates 
and employment conditions. Moreover, those losing their jobs in tradi-
tional economic activities as a result of these competitive advantages 
have little chance of fi nding employment elsewhere. For them, competi-
tion from newer Member States becomes a zero-sum game, whereby their 
prospects (or lack thereof) are in direct competition with persons from 
newer Member States.95 Lastly, even from the perspective of the migrant 
worker, does exercising free movement rights necessarily result in the 
migrant ‘benefi ting’ from the arrangement? If companies seek to recruit 
exclusively from low-wage countries precisely because they will put up 
with conditions unacceptable to native workers, and are furthermore 
less likely to challenge them through collective action or political engage-
ment, which workers actually benefi t from this situation?96
In the context of posted workers, a distinction must therefore be 
made between competition on the basis of labour costs between under-
takings in different regulatory regimes when compared to the situation 
of undertakings competing within the same jurisdiction. The application 
of differing wage rates and social protection rules can be used directly to 
outbid a domestic rival due to differences in labour costs, or otherwise 
put pressures on wages, leading to a race to the bottom. This can be re-
ferred to as a kind of regulatory arbitrage in which the undertaking can 
follow European rules but choose to remain partially outside the nation-
al industrial framework of the host country,97 often at the direct expense 
of workers in that country, and arguably the posted workers themselves. 
It can be concluded that it is when service providers compete on the basis 
of wage costs by using different state regulations to compete within the 
same jurisdiction that this fosters unfair competition and contributes 
to social dumping. The Directive, with its focus on parity of pay when 
work is performed in the same location, seeks to resolve this normative 
tension. Lastly, it should be noted that this parity of pay does not re-
quire the effective elimination of wage competition in the fi eld of service 
95  Sapir (n 85) 4; Schiek (n 24) 355.
96  On this point, see the fascinating account of James Bloodworth, Hired: Six Months Un-
dercover in Low-Wage Britain (Atlantic Books 2018). Particularly Part 1 which deals with 
the experience of working at the Amazon warehouse in Rugeley, England; see also Schiek 
(n 24) 364-365.
97  Lisa Berntsen and Nathan Lillie, ‘Breaking the Law? Varieties of Social Dumping in a 
pan-European Labour Market’ in M Bernaciak, Market Expansion and Social Dumping in 
Europe (Routledge 2015) 55.
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provision.98 Undertakings will still compete on the basis of labour costs 
generally: this is still an essential component of competition. Rather, 
any advantage gained in this respect should not simply be because an 
undertaking is established in another Member State. Likewise, foreign 
undertakings can still use their place of establishment in order to gain 
an advantage over domestic undertakings, but wage rates in the host 
State should not be basis for this advantage.
3.2 Deregulation and posted work 
The second critique of the Posted Workers Directive is that it has act-
ed as a tool of deregulation. This is an argument not limited to the area 
of service provision and posted work. There is long-standing criticism, 
most forcefully put forward by Scharpf,99  that the structural bias at the 
heart of European integration means that it has a liberalising effect on 
Member State legal systems, removing fl exibility in terms of the varied 
forms of market economies in the European Union, and converging to-
wards a ‘European’ ideal of a liberal market economy. In the context of 
posted work, this effectively means that Member States are prohibited 
from imposing their own higher wage rates and labour standards if they 
go beyond the ‘European’ ideal of what these should be. As the case law 
of the Court has shown, it is skewed towards fi nding national legislation 
enforcing higher domestic wages as restricting the free movement rights 
of foreign undertakings at the expense of national legislation.
The European Communities were originally based on the ‘Polanyian 
compromise’ of embedded liberalism, whereby measures aimed at freeing 
and liberalising the market (particularly in the case of the movement of 
persons) must be ‘embedded’ in the social norms, laws and policies that 
remain the exclusive right of national States.100 Indeed, the idea of Eu-
rope-wide labour standards was dismissed in the Spaak report. Instead, 
it was considered that currency devaluations would adequately allow for 
the elimination of distortions in wage costs, which were considered to 
happen only if undertakings were able to tap into a pool of low-cost labour 
98  Kosta (n 67) 197; see also de Vos (n 11) 357.
99  Scharpf (n 91); see also Fritz Scharpf ‘After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel Euro-
pean Democracy’ (2015) 21(3) European Law Journal 384.
100  Verschueren (n 12) 130. See also, Matthias Goldmann, ‘The Great Recurrence: Karl 
Polanyi and the Crises of the European Union’ (2017) 23 European Law Journal 272; Di-
amond Ashiagbor, ‘Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare 
Law in the Context of EU Market Integration’ (2013) 19(3) European Law Journal 303; 
John Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in 
the Postwar Economic Order’ (1982) 36(2) International Organisation 379; see also Karl 
Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time  (Beacon 
Publishing 1947).
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which was not open to fi rms based elsewhere. This original compromise 
was not drastically changed by the series of directives and regulations in 
the labour law fi eld in the 1970s and 1980s, as these only touched upon 
a small area of topics and set ‘fl oors’ not ‘ceilings’, allowing for plenty of 
discretion by Member States. However, this delicate balance is suggested 
to no longer apply. A variety of factors, such as negative integration, QMV 
voting, and mutual recognition, have created a structural bias which 
results in a process of deregulation, and a lowest-common-denominator 
approach to social protection. Nominal labour costs are no longer closely 
aligned across the Union, and currency devaluations are no longer pos-
sible within the Eurozone, with ‘internal devaluation’ by reducing labour 
costs being the main tool to regain competitiveness.101 
Social legislation comes under pressure from integration through 
law, as national rules are increasingly viewed as simply an obstacle to 
the exercise of free movement provisions.102 Moreover, mutual recogni-
tion often means that host-State regulation, such as labour law, is in-
compatible with internal market provisions, and there are few possibil-
ities for derogations. Cases are usually brought by parties that have an 
economic or personal stake in increasing mobility and deregulation, and 
the fi nancial resources to do so, often at the expense of the less mobile 
majority or those representing the interests of workers. All these factors 
mean that the law, independent of any liberal-based ideological prefer-
ence, will still be driven towards liberalisation, if only through searching 
for new obstacles to trade to remove. Moreover, the decisions of the Court 
can only have a deregulatory effect on Member States, and cannot adopt 
common European rules that substitute disapplied national regulations. 
Harmonisation at the European level is hampered by the requirement 
to fi nd consensus among Member States, given their diverse preferenc-
es and prerogatives. When adopting harmonising measures, the Court’s 
decisions gain a constitutional status that becomes the basis for future 
legislation, and any more radical suggestions are likely to be watered 
down or vetoed by a liberal Member State.103
These factors will affect different types of economies in different 
ways. Scharpf makes the distinction between ‘Liberal Market Economies’ 
(‘LMEs’, such as the UK and to some extent the Netherlands) on the one 
hand, and ‘Coordinated Market Economies’ (‘CMEs’, which he attributes 
to Continental European and Scandinavian countries) on the other, a 
distinction broadly along the lines of Esping-Andersen’s distinctions in 
101  Deakin (n 52) 19-20. 
102  Verschueren (n 12) 130.
103  Scharpf (n 91) 227.
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terms of the ‘worlds’ of capitalism.104 Generally speaking, LMEs sets the 
preconditions of a functioning market by protecting property rights, en-
forcing private contracts and ensuring a regime of undistorted compe-
tition. By their very nature, they will be relatively unaffected by dereg-
ulatory decisions of the Court and in fact often profi t from the removal 
of non-tariff barriers in other Member States. On the other side, CMEs 
create highly regulated and infl exible labour markets, with relations 
shaped by cooperative collective bargaining and interactions embedded 
in relatively stable network relationships,105 and are extremely vulnera-
ble to the deregulatory effects of negative integration. Only high regula-
tion States need to be concerned about their national laws being struck 
down, as Member State economies converge towards a Europeanised 
ideal liberal market economy. This convergence is based on a fallacious 
vertical relationship between the EU and the ‘Member States’, as if they 
were a homogenous collective bloc to which all rules apply equally. In-
stead, the divergent socio-cultural concerns between States are often at 
the very root of normative tension and political dissatisfaction generated 
by the recent progress of legal integration.106 The solution to this is re-reg-
ulation through secondary legislation at the European level, although 
the high consensus requirements generally favour status-quo positions, 
which tend to be in line with liberal market economies.
Turning to posted workers, the decisions of the Court of Justice 
clearly undermine the ability of CME Member States to apply their na-
tional legislation. In Laval, the Swedish CME rules on wage bargain-
ing were in confl ict with the European LME-style rules on minimum 
rates of pay. Rather than mitigating the deregulatory effects of integra-
tion through law, the Court’s approach to interpreting Article 3(1), when 
combined with the circular and self-reinforcing relationship between Ar-
ticle 56 TFEU and the Directive, means that its application deregulates 
in much the same way as negative integration through primary law.107 
This undermines the ability of Member States to pursue CME policies, 
as well as national autonomy and diversity. For example, Laval did not 
affect the vast majority of Member States, as they did not have Swed-
ish-style systems of wage bargaining. However, the rules provoked major 
normative diffi culty in Sweden, which had to amend national laws on 
wage calculation which had been in place since the 1930s.108 To meet 
104  Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Blackwell 1990). See 
also Peter Hall & David Soskice, The Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (OUP 2001).
105  Scharpf (n 91) 234.
106  Scharpf (n 91) 239-240.
107  Barnard (n 72) 123.
108  Scharpf (n 91) 230.
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the Court’s interpretation of what counts as minimum pay under the 
Directive, some States were required to do nothing, whilst others had to 
undertake a ‘genuinely radical restructuring of [the] collective bargain 
system’.109 Once a national measure falls outside the scope of the Direc-
tive, it seems almost impossible that it can be justifi ed. This was the case 
in Laval and Rüffert, as national measures could not be justifi ed on the 
basis of Article 56 TFEU, and was also the case in Commission v Luxem-
bourg in the context of the public policy exception under Article 3(10) of 
the Directive. The inability to fi nd consensus among the Member States 
showed the diffi culties in re-regulating social policy at the European 
level, with its legal bases being solely the service and establishment pro-
visions directly due to the QMV requirements, rather than unanimity, 
within the Council.  
3.3 Market bias within the Directive
It is a common critique of the Court that when confronted with a 
situation in which it must balance the interests of the market with the 
social, it will almost invariably put the rights of business and enterprise 
above those of, for example, workers. Those who would prefer a stronger 
social dimension within the process of European integration often fi nd 
themselves disappointed by the Court’s decisions, and the value it plac-
es on the ‘social’ within the EU legal order. In terms of posted workers, 
surprisingly little emphasis is placed on enforcing the rights of workers 
themselves, let along the effect on domestic workers. Cases tend to be 
framed around the ability of Member States to extend their domestic 
regulation to posted workers themselves, rather than posted workers be-
ing given the right to equal treatment with domestic workers.110 This has 
led to a situation where it was not even certain that the rights and pro-
tections that were conferred on posted workers could be invoked by the 
workers themselves. 
As has already been explained, the entire concept of posted work 
owes much to the specifi c legal rules applying to Portuguese service pro-
viders and their workers during the transitional period of the accession of 
the Southern Member States. Moreover, the decision to adopt the Direc-
tive solely on the basis of the services and establishment provisions was 
taken predominantly in order to get the legislation through the Council 
by circumventing unanimity requirements, and after a number of failed 
legislative attempts. This set the conditions for the Directive to be skewed 
towards the market rights of services providers rather than the social 
109  Kilpatrick (n 60) 853-854.
110  Davies (n 25) 590.
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rights of workers. The sole use of service and establishment provisions 
as legal bases to the Directive was contrary to the expectations of labour 
lawyers, who had widely assumed that the Directive would be based on 
protecting workers, rather than being a measure to facilitate freedom to 
provide services.111 Currently, the Directive makes no reference not just 
to the free movement of workers, but also to any social policy provisions 
of the Treaties. This means that posted workers are not entitled to the 
expansive reach of the non-discrimination principle that applies to work-
ers, and which protects not just migrant workers themselves, but also the 
workers of that Member State against migrant workers that are willing to 
work for lower wages and social conditions.112 Furthermore, the obligation 
in Article 152 TFEU to promote workers’ standards of living and working 
conditions does not apply to service providers and their posted workers. 
As there is no ‘constitutional basis’ for raising the employment standards 
of these workers, any application of national labour legislation is therefore 
regarded as an obstacle to the service provider.113 These persons become a 
mere factor of production − a commodity whose human value is secondary 
to the economic interests of their employer, the foreign service provider.
In this context, and whilst the Directive is nominally supposed to 
strike a balance between the interests of employers, posted workers, and 
host-State employees in a way which legitimises the posting of workers 
and facilitating the cross-border supply of services, it could be suggested 
that the Court will inevitably interpret provisions of the Directive like Ar-
ticle 3(1) with a pro-market stance. When making its decisions, the Court 
simply has no social factors to consider. That being said, the Court could 
have interpreted the Directive in a way to allow a variety of state practic-
es above the fl oor of mandatory protections. This is suggested to be an 
interpretation consistent with the widely accepted understanding of oth-
er directives and regulations, which do not seek to set out either uniform 
laws or even a level playing fi eld, but to establish a fl oor of rights above 
which regulatory competition is possible.114 However, the background to 
Article 3(1) shows that it is probably best understood as a confl ict of laws 
instrument that derogates from the country-of-origin principle, rather 
than as an instrument laying down minimum standards. That being 
said, the Directive is at least intended to confer labour law rights and 
the benefi ts of collective agreements upon posted workers, rather than 
removing such protections.115
111  Barnard (n 72) 126.
112  Schiek (n 24) 355
113  Verschueren (n 12) 136.
114  Deakin (n 52) 14-16.
115  ibid.
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4 Revising the Posted Workers Directive 
After being proposed in 2016, the Revision to the Directive has gone 
through a complicated adoption process. Ten Member State Parliaments, 
mainly from Eastern Europe (with the exception of Denmark), criticised 
the proposal using the yellow card procedure. In particular, they claimed 
the principle of ‘equal work for equal pay in the same place’, as well as the 
introduction of the concept of ‘remuneration’ in the Directive, would re-
move their competitive advantage. There was also predictably much wran-
gling between the Council members as various Member States tried to fur-
ther their own interests, as well as between the Council and Parliament. 
Despite this, the fi nal text for the Revision was adopted in June 2018 and 
the Revised Directive came into force in July. This fi nal section will exam-
ine: the Revision to the Directive in detail, looking at why it was proposed; 
the key changes to the text, in particular relating to remuneration; and 
its likely effects in terms of the issues arising from the Court’s case law, 
as well as the more fundamental issues outlined in the previous section. 
4.1 Justifying the Revision 
Whilst the problems arising from the Court’s acquis were recognised, 
it was considered that these could most adequately be dealt with through 
enhanced enforcement, rather than revising the legislation as such.116 In 
this respect, Directive 2014/67 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/
EC concerning the posting of workers was adopted.117 Additionally, the 
Court strictly enforced the Directive in cases of fraud and abuse. It held 
that national courts may disregard social security certifi cates issued 
fraudulently to posted workers,118 and found that whilst a national re-
quirement to send prior declaration of postings violated Article 56 TFEU, 
a requirement to keep copies of documents ‘equivalent to social or labour 
documents required under national law’ was permitted.119 The Court has 
more recently sought to clarify Article 3(1) of the Directive. It has held 
that minimum pay can be divided into separate pay groups, depending 
on the categorisation of employees, so long as its calculation is ‘bind-
ing and transparent’. Furthermore, a daily allowance, compensation for 
116  European Commission Impact Assessment, Revision of the legislative framework on 
the posting of workers in the context of the provision of services accompanying the docu-
ment Proposal on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers 
SWD(2012) 63 fi nal.
117  Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the frame-
work of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on admin-
istrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System [2012] OJ L159/11.
118  Case C-359/16 Ömer Altun ECLI:EU:C:2018:63.
119  Case C-515/08 Vitor Manuel dos Santos Palhota ECLI:EU:C:2010:589.
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daily travelling time, and annual holiday had to be included within the 
concept of the minimum rate of pay under Article 3(1), although accom-
modation and meal vouchers did not.120  It has also held that in order to 
meet the defi nition of ‘hiring-out’ under the Directive, the movement of 
posted workers must be for the ‘very purpose of the supply of services’.121 
The Court has also held that if an employer requires the worker to carry 
out additional work, or work ‘under particular conditions’, this must be 
compensated for but does not need to be taken into account when calcu-
lating the ‘minimum rate of pay’ under the Directive.122 
Despite these modest developments, it was considered necessary ‘af-
ter 20 years’ to reassess the balance between promoting the freedom to 
provide services and ensuring fair competition, with the need to protect 
the rights of posted workers.123 Empirical evidence suggests that criti-
cism of the posted workers’ regime is well founded. Initially it is worth 
highlighting the stark differences in labour costs throughout the Euro-
pean Union. Eurostat data indicate that whilst the costs of an average 
hour of work for employers (including pay and non-wage costs like social 
security contributions, etc) are around €40 - €42 in States such as Den-
mark and Belgium, in Romania and Bulgaria the costs are around €5 
per hour.124 In fact, already in 2012 the Commission recognised that the 
Directive ‘puts pressure on local labour markets and working conditions 
in particular in high unemployment regions’,125 even if it considered that 
this could be fi xed through better enforcement rather than amending 
the legislation. However, in its more recent Impact Assessment for the 
revised Directive, the Commission was more assertive: ‘posted workers 
are reported to receive lower remuneration than local workers, especially 
in high-wage receiving countries’. The Commission also indicated that 
− even when complying with the Directive − wages for posted workers 
were on average 10% - 15% lower in the Danish construction industry, 
25% - 35% lower in the Dutch construction industry, and up to 50% 
lower in the Belgian road transport sector.126 More problematic is that 
in some jurisdictions posted workers are only entitled to the minimum 
legislated wage in that State, regardless of the going rate for a particular 
120  Case C-396/13 Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry ECLI:EU:C:2015:86.
121  Case C586/13 Martin Meat kft ECLI:EU:C:2015:405.
122  Case C522/12 Tevfi k Isbir ECLI:EU:C:2013:711; see also Case C-341/02 Commission v 
Germany ECLI:EU:C:2005:220.
123  Directive 2018/957, Recital 4.
124  See Eurostat, Wages and Labour Costs (2017) available at <https://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Wages_and_labour_costs#Main_statistical_fi nd-
ings> accessed 17 December 2018. 
125  European Commission Impact Assessment (n 116) 23.
126  European Commission Impact Assessment (n 5) 13.
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job. In the UK, posted workers generally receive just 40% of the average 
wage, whilst in more protective States, such as Sweden and Denmark, 
posted workers receive only 70% of the average wage. This led the Com-
mission to conclude that the Directive ‘can exert downward wage and 
overall labour cost competition on local companies and workers in high-
wage Member States’.127 The effects of these differences should not be 
overlooked or trivialised. Even a small difference in wage rates between 
domestic and foreign service providers is likely to have a signifi cant effect 
on the behaviour of undertakings and governments. Domestic under-
takings will need to regain competitiveness, which will most likely be 
done through a reduction in their own labour costs, or by lobbying state 
actors to reduce national standards (under the guise of ‘fl exibility’ and 
‘competitiveness’) to level the playing fi eld. It should also be noted that it 
is not just the high-wage countries that are liable to suffer from this vi-
cious circle. Posted workers may not cause low-wage countries to actively 
reduce their standards even further, but they give them no incentive to 
increase their standards or to ‘catch up’ with high-wage States. This 
problem will be exacerbated if the receiving States in turn reduce their 
own standards, possibly contributing to a race-to-the-bottom.
4.2 The Revised Directive and the new rules on remuneration 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the controversy within the Council 
over the term, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work in the same 
place’ does not appear in the fi nal text of the Directive. That being said, 
it does make an explicit link between the principles of ‘equal treatment’ 
and ‘equal pay’, which has been implemented through secondary law, not 
only between women and men, but also between fi xed-term and perma-
nent workers, part-time and full-time workers, and temporary and per-
manent workers.128 Equal pay generally has a long history in the Treaties: 
Article 157 TFEU states that Member States shall ensure the principle 
of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal 
value is applied.129 The Directive is not so explicit in its language, but it 
clearly places more weight on the idea of equal treatment and equal pay 
between posted and native workers. Equal treatment in terms of equal 
pay between posted workers and domestic workers in the same location 
is a guiding principle of the Revised Directive, although the Commission 
rejected some of the more far-reaching ideas to ensure equal pay, such as 
using a reference undertaking.130
127  European Commission Impact Assessment (n 5) 12-14.
128  Directive 2018/957 (n 9) Recital 6.
129  Case 43-75 Defrenne ECLI:EU:C:1976:56.
130  European Commission Impact Assessment (n 5) 27.
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In respect to Article 3 of the Revised Directive, the concrete changes 
to the fi nal text are not extensive, although they were in fact the most 
radical of the options considered by the Commission. Other options in-
volved more ‘clarifi cation’ on the rules on minimum rates of pay by the 
Court of Justice, rather than new legislation.131 As well as the rules on 
remuneration, the Directive will also legislate for long-term posting. For 
postings longer than 12 months, the host Member States should guar-
antee the ‘terms and conditions of employment that are mandatorily ap-
plicable to workers in the Member State where the work is carried out’.132 
The principle of equal pay is explicitly mentioned,133 and the Directive 
also focuses specifi cally on agency workers, as the principle of equal pay 
enshrined in Directive 2008/104/EC should apply to temporary agency 
workers posted to the territory of another Member State. 
For our purposes, in the context of rates of pay under Article 3(1)(c), 
this has changed from ‘minimum rates of pay’ to ‘remuneration, includ-
ing overtime rates’. This is explained in more detail within Article 3(1): 
remuneration means all the elements of remuneration rendered man-
datory by national law, regulation or administrative provision, collective 
agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally 
applicable and/or, in the absence of a system for declaring collective 
agreements or arbitration awards to be of universal application, other 
collective agreements or arbitration awards within the meaning of par-
agraph 8 second subparagraph, in the Member State to whose territory 
the worker is posted. 
During discussions in the Council, this was amended to ‘the concept 
of remuneration shall be determined by the national law and / or practice 
of the Member State’,134 in a move which places even more emphasis on 
national systems of wage setting. In this regard, Recital 17 specifi cally 
states that ‘the setting of wages is a matter for the Member States and 
the social partners alone. Particular care should be taken not to un-
dermine national systems of wage setting or the freedom of the parties 
concerned’. This was again included by the Council, as it emphasised 
that this should include ‘but should not be limited to, all the elements of 
131  ibid, 22.
132  Directive 2018/957 (n 9) Recital 9; see also Council of European Union, Proposal for 
Directive on Posting of Workers − Analysis of the fi nal compromise text with a view to 
agreement (28 March 2018) 7350/18, 6. Under Directive 2018/957, Art 3(1)(a), this can be 
extended by an additional 6 months.
133  Directive 2018/957, Recital 6; Council of European Union, Proposal for Directive on 
Posting of Workers − Analysis of the fi nal compromise text with a view to agreement, Recital 
7; see also Proposal for a Directive (n 4) Recital 5.
134  Council of the European Union, General Approach to the Proposal for a Revision amend-
ing the Posted Workers Directive 13612/17, 11-12.
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minimum rates of pay developed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’.135 Furthermore, the total gross amounts of remuneration should 
be compared, rather than individual elements of remuneration rendered 
mandatory as provided for in Article 3(1).136 Recitals 17 and 18 explic-
itly state that all gross earnings and additional allowances should be 
considered within the concept of remuneration, instructions which also 
make their way into Article 3. It should also be noted that allowances 
are included under the Directive under Article 3(1)(i). Recital 8 clarifi es 
that posted workers should receive ‘at least the same allowances or re-
imbursement of expenditure to cover travel, board and lodging expenses’ 
as are applicable to local workers. This should apply to the expenditure 
incurred by posted workers required to travel to and from their regular 
place of work. However, it is noted that ‘double payments’ of travel, board 
and lodging expenses should be avoided. Whilst the actual wording has 
changed little, there is more indication of what the changes mean in the 
recital to the Proposed Directive. 
4.3 The effects of the revision 
Providing more discretion to Member States to ensure a level playing 
fi eld between service providers in their territory, particularly in regard 
to remuneration, is clearly the guiding objective of the Directive, and it 
will certainly provide more discretion in this regard. In fact, in a number 
of ways, for example the defi nition of remuneration, the emphasis on na-
tional systems of wage setting, and the reduction of the threshold before 
a posting is ‘long-term’, the fi nal text goes even further than the Com-
mission’s 2016 proposal. Specifi c to the concept of remuneration, the 
Directive is much clearer: this encompasses all gross pay and associated 
allowances and benefi ts, as well as the prerogative of Member States to 
set up their systems of wage negations and industrial relations, in what 
is clearly an attempt to avoid another Laval situation. That being said, 
the precise legal value of the changes will depend greatly on the Court’s 
approach to interpreting the Revised Directive in future cases, and the 
extent to which it ‘rebalances’ the protection of workers against those of 
service providers. The following section will assess the extent to which 
this will happen, looking at both the acquis of the Court and the wider 
problems outlined in the previous section.
135  ibid, 6.
136  ibid.
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4.3.1 The Court’s case law
It is probably the case that the Revision to the Directive is directed 
primarily at the Laval decision. Under the new Directive, the concept of 
‘remuneration’ would cover the Swedish trade union’s imposition of a 16 
per hour wage in additional to other benefi ts and allowances. Given the 
extensive explanation of the term ‘remuneration’ within the Revision, it 
would be impossible to interpret this as being outside the scope of Ar-
ticle 3(1). That being said, the question over the actual action a social 
partner can take to enforce such wage demands, even if they fall under 
Article 3(1), still remains. However, interestingly, the references included 
within the Proposal for a Revised Directive to the caveat that the appli-
cation on rules on remuneration ‘must not disproportionately restrict the 
cross-border provision of services’137 have all been removed in the fi nal 
text of the Directive. Instead, the Directive emphasises the need not to 
undermine national systems of wage settings as well as to protect the 
diversity of national industrial relations,138 as will likely be the case in 
situations like Laval where there is no legislated applicable rate of pay. 
Having said this, it should be noted that the Revision to the Directive 
does very little to change how measures are justifi ed under the public 
policy provision in Article 3(10) of the Directive, as well as the extent (if 
any) to which measures falling outside the scope of Article 3(1) can be 
justifi ed under Article 56 TFEU.
The Rüffert decision is more problematic. There have not been sig-
nifi cant changes to Article 3(8) of the Directive, apart from it being ex-
tended to all sectors of the economy, which will obviously allow for more 
collective agreements to be covered under the Directive.139 Whilst the 
new rules and emphasis on national systems of wage setting will cer-
tainly allow for more types of collective agreements to be enforced under 
the Directive, it is not clear that a local authority can impose collective-
ly agreed wages that are higher than collective agreements or legislat-
ed wages applicable in the private sector. Concretely, it is still unclear 
whether the private/public sector discrimination distinction still applies, 
or whether such measures (for example, the pursuit of a non-binding 
‘living wage’) would justify such a measure. 
There is also the question of whether the introduction of the 2004 
and 2014 Public Procurement Directives have made the Rüffert decision 
redundant. It is true that the 2004 and particularly the 2014 Directive 
137  Proposal for a Directive (n 4) Recital 12.
138  Directive 957/2018 (n 9) Recital 24.
139  Proposal for a Directive (n 4) 7; see also Directive 2018/957 (n 9) Art. 3(1), in which 
the sentence contained in Directive 96/71/EC, Art. 3(1) which ensures its application was 
solely to ‘activities referred to in the Annex’ has been removed.
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have more focus on the social considerations that can be included with-
in public tenders.140 In the wake of the Court’s decision in Regiopost, 
some (including this author) were quick to suggest that Member States 
could now demand higher rates than are legislated for when tendering 
out public services.141 However, this conclusion may have been too hast-
ily reached. It should be emphasised that in Regiopost the Court did not 
distance itself from its previous Rüffert decision, or indeed discuss the 
extent to which it was decided that way due to the lack of applicable 
Public Procurement Directives at the time. Instead, the Court sought 
to differentiate the factual circumstances between the two cases.142 Ac-
cording to the Court, Rüffert concerned a ‘collective agreement applying 
solely to the construction sector, which did not cover private contracts 
and had not been declared universally applicable’ which ‘exceeded the 
minimum rate of pay applicable to that sector under the AEntG (Posted 
Workers Law)’.143 This approach was confi rmed in Bundesruckerei, when 
it was held that social considerations under the Public Procurement Di-
rective ‘may be imposed only to the extent to which they are compatible 
with Community law’.144 Therefore, social considerations that imposed 
wage demands in public tenders that go beyond minimum rates of pay 
constitute ‘an additional burden that may prohibit, impede, or render 
less attractive the provision of services in the host Member State’.145 The 
Court repeated the private/public discrimination principle, suggesting 
that such a measure is not appropriate for the aim of avoiding social 
dumping as it cannot be said that employees working in the private sec-
tor were not in need of the ‘same wage protection as those in the context 
of public contracts’.146 On the other hand, in Regiopost the minimum rate 
of pay was legislated for in law, and applied generally to the award of any 
public contract in the Rhineland-Palatinate ‘irrespective of the sector 
concerned’.147 The Court went even further, suggesting that at the time of 
the facts, there was no legislated minimum wage applicable to the postal 
140  See Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 Febru-
ary 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L94/65, 
Art 18; Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 
2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114, Art 26.
141  See, for example, Daniel Carter ‘CJEU (Finally) Takes Stance against Social Dumping’ 
(Leiden Law Blog, February 2016) available at <https://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/cjeu-fi -
nally-takes-stance-against-social-dumping> accessed 23 December 2018. 
142  See Case C115/14 Regiopost ECLI:EU:C:2015:760, paras 73-75.
143  ibid, para 74.
144  Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235, para 28.
145  ibid, para 30.
146  ibid, paras 31-32.
147  Regiopost (n 142) para 75.
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sector, and as such the rates demanded of the tenders was indeed the 
‘minimum social protection’ (in a curious deviation from its approach in 
Laval).148 Therefore, Regiopost would not seem to overturn Rüffert, even 
in the light of the Public Procurement Directive. Indeed, it is ‘almost 
certainly not the case’ whether it really allows contracting authorities 
to impose social conditions which exceed those laid down in national 
legislation.149
4.3.2 Wage competition and social dumping 
In the previous section it was concluded that the use of differing 
regulatory obligations between Member States, specifi cally when foreign 
service providers are able to compete unfairly on a national market by 
circumventing national wage demands in order to gain a competitive 
advantage, strays beyond the normal use of internal market rules and 
into the area of unfair competition that can undercut local competitors 
and place pressures on domestic workers’ wages. At least in the context 
of posted work, this should be seen as constituting ‘social dumping’. The 
shift from minimum pay to remuneration, as well as the new rules on em-
ployment agency postings and allowances, will likely mitigate the most 
negative effects of the current posted workers’ regime. Moreover, there is 
less focus on competition on the basis of wages and labour costs in the 
Revised Directive. In its Impact Assessment, the European Commission 
fi nally recognised that wage competition can have signifi cant negative 
effects on wage rates and foster an environment of unfair competition, at 
least when undertakings can use diverging regulatory regimes in order 
to pay less than domestic rivals. That being said, it was still included in 
the proposal that competition based on labour costs is an important part 
of the internal market.150 Interestingly, however, by the time of the fi nal 
text, ‘labour costs’ were removed from the list of factors of competition 
contained in the preamble to the Directive.151
The changes to remuneration will surely result in a more level play-
ing fi eld when service providers are competing within the same jurisdic-
tion. In principle, Member States and their social partners will be able to 
demand that foreign service providers pay collectively agreed and even 
148 ibid, para 76.
149  Joosje Hamilton and Ryan Brendan, ‘Minimum Wage Special Conditions in Pub-
lic Procurement Tender Processes: Regiopost v Stadt Landau (Case C-115/14)’ (Febru-
ary 2016) available at <www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/136611/
minimum-wage-special-conditions-in-public-procurement-tender-processes-re-
giopost-v-stadt-landau-case-c-1151> 23 December 2018. 
150  Proposal for a Directive (n 4) Recital 11.  
151  Directive 2018/957 (n 9) Recital 16
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case-by-case negotiated wage rates. The Directive now makes reference 
not just to laws and collective agreements, but also to the practice of 
Member States. As such, the regulatory gap that allowed such dispari-
ties in terms of wage obligations existing for domestic and foreign service 
providers (and even changes in the applicable law) that arose from the 
Laval judgment will be closed. 
However, this does not totally exclude wage competition from the 
process, particularly if we consider the idea of remuneration or labour 
costs in the wider sense. As has already been mentioned, in Rüffert an 
infringement was found precisely because the undertaking would ‘lose 
the competitive advantage which they enjoy by reason of their lower wage 
costs’.152 Nothing suggests that this is no longer the case. It is also un-
clear whether local authorities can make wage demands in procurement 
tenders that would bind domestic service providers but which cannot 
be applied to foreign ones. If so, then the use of diverging regulatory 
jurisdictions may still signifi cantly undermine the core objective of the 
Directive. Whilst not related to remuneration strictu sensu, the Revised 
Directive does nothing to change the rules of social security payments. 
As these are based on the host-State legislation, there remains a sharp 
division between the obligations applying domestic and foreign service 
providers. As explained previously, employer costs per worker can range 
from around 40 per hour in Belgium and Denmark, to around 3-4 in 
Romania and Bulgaria. This still offers a signifi cant advantage for for-
eign service providers in terms of their labour costs in the wider sense, 
even if not remuneration in the simple sense. That being said, the fi nal 
text dictates that long-term postings (ie postings that last more than 
12/18 months) be subject to the host-State legislation, meaning they will 
be fully embedded in the society of the host State, at least to the same 
extent as regular workers under Article 45 TFEU. Whilst competition on 
the basis of wages and labour costs will not be entirely removed from the 
use of posted workers within the system of service provision in the Euro-
pean Union, the Revised Directive certainly looks likely to mitigate some 
of the most damaging effects of the Court’s approach to interpreting the 
Directive. 
4.3.3 Posted workers and deregulation
In the previous section it was explained how the original Posted 
Worker Directive was effectively applied as a tool of deregulation. Rather 
than re-regulating at the European level towards a more socially inclined 
system, the Directive actually took the more deregulatory aspects of the 
152  Ruffert (n 2) para 14.
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pre-Directive acquis and rejected some of the more protective principles 
as espoused by the Court of Justice.153 Rather than enforcing minimum 
standards, decisions such as Laval and Rüffert have been essentially an 
opportunity for undertakings to challenge Member State practices that 
go above minimum pay obligations. Moreover, the inability of Member 
States to justify such national measures means the Directive has served 
to deregulate some Member State systems of wage setting, and pushed 
Member States towards a ‘European’ Liberal Model, thereby undermin-
ing any CME’s higher labour standards and collective agreements. This 
can be evidenced by the fact that the more CME-inclined States were the 
most aggrieved by the current situation. The Revised Directive will bet-
ter ensure this diversity by extending the rules on collective agreements 
to all sectors of the economy, which, when combined with the shift from 
a minimum rate of pay to total remuneration, will go some way to com-
batting the deregulatory nature of the Directive. Overall, there is surely 
more fl exibility offered to Member States that seek to pursue more CME 
policies. Certainly, it seems that CMEs would not have to change their 
laws in order to accommodate decisions of the Court such as Laval.
Whilst there was clearly diffi culty in fi nding consensus within the 
Council, this was not, as Scharpf’s theory might suggest, fatal to the 
Directive’s chances of being adopted. There was not just disagreement 
between LME and CME States that are ideologically opposed, but also 
between older high-wage States and the newer low-wage States, the latter 
of which stood to gain from the current system (and notwithstanding any 
ideological opposition). On the face of it, this seems to have been achieved 
without excessively watering down the changes to the Directive, which is 
surprising given the extent to which it potentially removes the compet-
itive advantage of foreign service providers. If anything, during trilogue 
discussions the Directive has arguably become more protective of nation-
al systems of wage setting and industrial relations. The episode should 
offer encouragement to those adhering to Scharpf’s pessimistic view of 
re-regulation at the European level.
That being said, there are certain deregulatory aspects of the Di-
rective that may remain. Despite the emphasis on remuneration, rather 
than minimum pay, Article 3(1) still sets minimum and maximum stan-
dards that Member States are not permitted to go beyond. It is unclear to 
what extent Member States can make demands of all undertakings (both 
foreign and domestic) if these go beyond rates of pay that are ‘universal-
ly’ applicable under the Directive. For example, it is unclear whether the 
private/public sector distinction exists and whether a Member State can 
demand that undertakings commit to pay higher wages in public sector 
153  Verschueren (n 12). 
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contracts. Finally, even when national measures fall outside the scope of 
the Directive, there are very limited justifi cations on which the Member 
State can rely, either through Article 56 TFEU or relying directly on the 
public policy exception included within the Directive. It seems unlikely 
that the Revised Directive will change anything in this regard. That be-
ing said, earlier statements indicating that rules on remuneration must 
not disproportionately restrict the cross-border provision of services were 
removed from the fi nal text of the Revised Directive.154 The Directive now 
only includes a generic reference to the fact that restrictions to the free-
dom to provide services are allowed ‘only if they are justifi ed by overrid-
ing reasons in the public interest and if they are proportionate and nec-
essary’.155 Despite the improved rhetoric in the preamble, it is unlikely 
that there will be concrete changes to the justifi cations of measures that 
go beyond the rules in Article 3(1). 
4.3.4 Market bias in the Revised Directive
This paper has made the suggestion that the ‘market bias’ of the 
Directive, ie that it is adopted using solely the provisions on services 
and establishment, ensures that when confronted by ambiguously word-
ed provisions, such as Article 3(1) of the current Directive, the Court 
of Justice inevitably opts for a more (or arguably the most) pro-market 
interpretation. In the context of posted workers, the Advocates Gener-
al in Laval, Rüffert and Commission v Luxembourg all came to different 
conclusions from the Court, often using entirely different approaches to 
do so. It is clear that Article 3(1) of the Revised Directive is much less 
ambiguous than the previous wording of the provision. As such, it offers 
much less scope for interpretation by the Court. The Directive includes 
rules on what benefi ts and allowances should be included within the 
concept of remuneration under the Directive. More generally speaking, at 
least in the preamble to the Revised Directive, there is also more focus on 
the position of the posted workers themselves, rather than solely service 
providers. The Directive makes clear that there is a need to reassess the 
balance struck between promoting the free movement of services and the 
need to protect workers,156 and makes more reference to the protection of 
the posted workers themselves, particularly in terms of pay.157 There is 
also reference to the Union goal of promoting social justice and protec-
154  See Proposal for a Directive (n 4) Recitals 12 & 13.
155  Directive 2018/957, Recital 10.
156  Directive 2018/957, Recital 4.
157  See, inter alia, Directive 2018/957, Recitals 10 & 24. See also European Parliament and 
Council Agreed Position, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services (14th June 2018) 2016/0070 (COD) PE-CONS 18/18.
67CYELP 14 [2018] 31-68
tion, as well as its obligation under Article 9 TFEU to ‘take into account’ 
requirements relating to high employment, social protection, combatting 
social exclusion, education, training, and human health.158 
However, despite the overtures contained within the preamble, it 
is still based solely on the provisions on establishment and services. 
Whist this is understandable, given the Directive’s status as a revision 
to a Directive, which was based on these Treaty freedoms, as has been 
explained before, this was predominantly the result of the free movement 
of workers provisions not applying to Portuguese undertakings during 
the transitional period in the Southern Accession Member States, as well 
as the inability to fi nd unanimity within the Council. The Directive has 
not been updated to be additionally based on workers or social policy 
provisions in the Treaties, despite the increased mention of worker pro-
tection and other social elements of European integration in the Revised 
Directive.
Therefore, despite the fact that Article 3(1) of the Revised Directive 
is much less ambiguous than the previous wording of the provision and 
the term remuneration being accompanied by extensive explanations, as 
well as the more worker friendly language in the preamble, the Directive 
is still skewed towards establishment and services without reference to 
the free movement of workers or the Treaty’s social provisions. Despite 
removing most of the previous ambiguities of Article 3(1), some will in-
evitably remain. Whilst the rules on remuneration strictu sensu may be 
clearer, uncertainties will remain in relation to wider benefi ts, cash or 
otherwise, related to employment or labour standards generally. Fur-
thermore, the Court will likely have to interpret the scope of the new 
rules on agency workers and short-term postings. Much will therefore 
depend on the Court’s approach in future cases, and in particular the 
extent to which it re-balances the system of posted work in the EU away 
from service providers and towards the protection of workers. 
5 Conclusion
The process of adopting the Revised Directive, with its guiding aim 
of ‘equal pay for equal work in the same place’, indicates clear recognition 
that the system of posted work as it currently functions has the potential 
to undermine local wages and employment conditions, thereby fostering 
unfair competition and social dumping. Analysis of previous decisions 
of the Court of Justice, along with empirical evidence, puts this beyond 
dispute. Given the vastly divergent interests at stake, it is commendable 
that the Revised Directive was adopted at all. Encouragingly, the Direc-
158  Directive 2018/957, Recital 3. See also Article 3 TEU and Article 9 TFEU.
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tive has been adopted without the main changes, in particular the provi-
sions of remuneration, being watered down excessively. If anything, the 
opposite seems to have been the case during the adoption process. In the 
fi nal text of the Directive, there is strong emphasis on ensuring parity 
of pay between posted and domestic workers, as well as the protection of 
workers themselves. Moreover, the Directive will apply to a broader range 
of situations and it takes into greater consideration national systems of 
wage setting and industrial relations. 
The Revised Directive should go some way to rectifying the problems 
caused by the Court’s approach to interpreting the Directive, in partic-
ular the Laval decision. That being said, it is unclear to what extent the 
Member States can go beyond the conditions laid down in Article 3(1), 
particularly in cases concerning public procurement. More fundamen-
tally, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work in the same place’ seeks 
to strike a new normative balance between the concepts of wage competi-
tion and social dumping. The new Directive also goes some way towards 
countering the pessimistic hypothesis of Scharpf, given that there was 
an agreement found despite the parties’ confl icting interests, as well as 
the fact that the Revised Directive will (or at least should) provide more 
fl exibility in terms of coordinated market economies’ ability to enforce 
their labour laws, for example in a Laval-type situation. Lastly, the legal 
bases of the Directive have not changed, meaning the Directive is still 
not based on any of the social provisions in the Treaties. 
The transposition date for the new Directive is not until 30 July 
2020, and therefore we may not see any concrete changes to the posted 
workers’ regime until that point. Of course, much will depend on the atti-
tude of the Court to cases concerning posted workers, and the emphasis 
it places on striking a new balance between the interests of service pro-
viders and workers. It will take a shift in attitude and approach from the 
Court to overcome the Directive’s in-built market logic and deregulatory 
effects. When considering the precise scope and value of the Revised 
Directive, the Court would do well to consider the concluding passage 
of Barnard back in 2012, which seems even more pertinent now than it 
was back then: European integration will collapse if ordinary Europeans 
feel it is about little more than open markets. Without a strong social di-
mension the project is doomed to fail. The historic bargain between the 
interests of open markets and workers and trade unions has served the 
continent well for decades, and is one we abandon at our peril. 159
159  Barnard (n 56) 135, referencing the words of ex-Trade Union Congress Chairman Bren-
dan Barber.
